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A CONTEMPORARY APPRAISAL OF CONDEMNATION
IN MARYLAND
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and
JOHN J. GHINGHER, III**
The steadily increasing need for public roads, public buildings,
public utilities, and particularly for urban redevelopment has made
commonplace the condemnation of private property for those purposes
and has drawn increased attention to the plight of the condemnee.
In addition to the "fair market value" of his property, he now
receives moving expenses, an allowance for machinery and equipment
which he must abandon, assistance in relocating his business or resi-
dence, and rent concessions pending relocation; but these fringe benefits
are primarily underwritten by federal aid." In Maryland, as in most
other states, the legal process whereby private property is taken for
public use still contains many imperfections, most of which operate
to the detriment of the condemnee. This article will focus upon some
of the more important aspects of the present Maryland law, itsinterpretation by the courts and some of the consequences resulting
from its administration. It is not intended as a comprehensive review
of Maryland condemnation law, but as a commentary upon certain
salient aspects of that body of law.
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University; LLB., 1941, University of Maryland School of Law.
** Associate, Weinberg & Green, Baltimore, Maryland; A.B., 1966, PrincetonUniversity; J.D., 1969, University of Maryland School of Law; Editor-in-Chief,
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1. Until quite recently allowances for relocation expenses were provided for in
the enabling legislation for the various federal and federal assistance programs which
contemplated the use of condemnation to acquire the property necessary for suchprograms. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 2680 (1964) (public works projects of Department
of Defense) ; 23 U.S.C. §§ 501-11 (1964) (federal-aid highways) ; 42 U.S.C. § 1415(8)(1964) (low rent housing); 42 U.S.C. § 1465 (1964) (urban renewal projects);
42 U.S.C. § 2473 (1964) (National Space Program); 42 U.S.C. § 3074 (1964)(HUD assistance programs); 42 U.S.C. § 3307 (1964) (HUD comprehensive citydemonstration programs) ; 43 U.S.C. § 1231 (1964) (acquisition of lands by Depart-
ment of Interior) ; 49 U.S.C. § 1606(b) (1964) (mass transportation). As of January
2, 1971, the various relocation assistance provisions have been consolidated into theUniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970.
Pub. L. No. 91-646, 84 Stat. 1894. See note 108 infra.
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I. THE RIGHT To CONDEMN
Central to the right of the State to condemn property is the
requirement that the taking contemplated be for a "public use." This
important limitation on the power of eminent domain is imposed in
express terms by article III, section 40 of the Maryland Constitution
and is echoed in each of the other constitutional provisions which
confer the power.2 However, the requirement of public use manifests
itself in two distinct forms in the Maryland Constitutional scheme.
Sections 40, 40A, 40B and 40C of article III simply state that takings
of private property must be for "public use, ' 3 while the eminent
domain provisions of articles XI-B, XI-C and XI-D declare that the
specific purposes for which condemnation is authorized by those articles
are "public uses."'4  Judicial interpretation of these two different
manifestations of the public use requirement has resulted in a rather
unique theoretical enigma.
The case of Riden v. Philadelphia, Baltimore & Washington R.R.5
is cited most frequently for the definition of public use as that term
is employed in article III. In that case the Maryland Court of Appeals
was asked to decide whether a private railroad company's construction
of a branch line to the Bowie Race Track was a public use for which
private property could be condemned. The court concluded that "public
use" meant not a use which benefits the public but rather an actual use
by the public. 6 The court, noting that "horse racing has been one
of the most popular sports in Maryland since Colonial days, ' 7 deemed
the proposed branch line a proper public use.'
In considering the power of Baltimore City to condemn property
for the purpose of urban redevelopment under article XI-B of the
2. The Maryland scheme for condemnation is embodied in seven different sec-
tions of the constitution. MD. CONST. art. III, §§ 40, 40A, 40B, 40C; MD. CONST.
arts. XI-B, XI-C, XI-D.
3. MD. CONST. art. III, § 40 is the basic source of authority for the power of
eminent domain. It provides: "The General Assembly shall enact no Law authorizing
private property, to be taken for public use, without just compensation, as agreed
upon between the parties, or awarded by a Jury, being first paid or tendered to the
party entitled to such compensation." Sections 40A, 40B and 40C invest Baltimore
City, Baltimore County, Montgomery County, the State Roads Commission and the
Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission with "quick-take" powers. Each of
these sections uses the same language as to public use employed in section 40.
4. MD. CONST. arts. XI-B, XI-C and XI-D, respectively, authorize the Mary-
land General Assembly to invest Baltimore City with the authority to acquire
urban property by condemnation for the purpose of urban redevelopment, off-street
parking and port development.
5. 182 Md. 336, 35 A.2d 99 (1944).
6. The court shunned the "public benefit" definition applied by some statesbecause it would leave judges "free to indulge their own views of public utility or
advantage." 182 Md. at 341, 35 A.2d at 101, quoting Ansperger v. Crawford, 101 Md.
247, 253, 61 A. 413, 415 (1905).
7. 182 Md. at 345, 35 A.2d at 103.
8. The "use by the public" standard articulated in the Riden case apparently
would include such uses as a public highway, Bond v. Mayor & City Council, 116 Md.
583; 82 A. 978 (1911); a railroad line necessary for operation of coal mines, New
Central Coal Co. v. George's Creek Coal & Iron Co., 37 Md. 537 (1873); the taking
of oysters by the public, Cox v. Revelle, 125 Md. 579, 94 A. 203 (1915); conveyance
of water to the city, Kane v. Mayor & City Council, 15 Md. 240 (1860); and the
supplying of electric power to the public, Webster v. Susquehanna Pole Line Co.,
112 Md. 416, 76 A. 254 (1910).
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Maryland Constitution, the court, in Herzinger v. Mayor & City
Council,9 took an altogether different view of "public use." The
property owner in that case challenged article XI-B on the theory that
its provisions authorized a taking for a private use in contravention
of the fourteenth amendment, in spite of the assertion in the article
that any taking authorized therein was deemed to be a public use.10
The Court of Appeals held that the proper standard of "public use"
to be applied under the fourteenth amendment was not the "use by
the public" test articulated in Riden, but the "public benefit" definition
which Riden had rejected as overly speculative, explaining that "the
fact that after the taking the property may be put into private hands
does not destroy the public character of the taking insofar as that taking
may accomplish a proper public benefit.""
As a result of Riden and Herzinger, the concept of public use
in -the Maryland context varies depending upon the constitutional
authority for the taking. This unusual development has created a
situation whereby a use which would fall outside the standard of
"use by the public" articulated in Riden, such as the condemnation
of slum dwellings for the purpose of constructing a more modern and
sanitary housing development, would be perfectly proper if authorized
by article XI-B, as long as the use is for the "public benefit" under
the fourteenth amendment standard articulated in the Herzinger ruling.
This apparent anomaly was recognized by the Court of Appeals in
Master Royalties v. Mayor & City Council1" in which the court
declared that article XI-B embodies a broader concept of public use
than that contained in article III, section 40, as interpreted by Riden.
Thus, Maryland has two distinct concepts of public use, both of which
are of constitutional dimension: a taking under article III, section 40 is
constitutional only if the property is to be used "by the public," while
the purpose of the takings authorized by article XI-B is constitutional
if it is for the "public benefit."
The second element which must be present before the condemning
authority may take the designated property is that there be some
necessity for the taking. Unlike the issue of public use, which is a
question of law for the consideration of the court, the question of
necessity has been characterized by the court as a matter for legislative
or administrative determination.1" Accordingly, the Court of Appeals
9. 203 Md. 49, 98 A.2d 87 (1953).
10. Because article XI-B was itself a constitutional provision, no attack on its
validity could have been based on a conflict with article III, section 40. Since both
articles were of constitutional dimension, article XI-B could be unconstitutional only
as a result of conflict with the fourteenth amendment. See Master Royalties Corp. v.
Mayor & City Council, 235 Md. 74, 200 A.2d 652 (1964). For a detailed presentation
of the public purpose standard of federal due process, see Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26 (1954).
11. 203 Md. at 60, 98 A.2d at 92 (emphasis added).
12. 235 Md. 74, 200 A.2d 652 (1964).
13. See 182 Md. 336, 345, 35 A.2d 99, 103 (1944). Both elements of the right
to condemn are matters for preliminary determination by the court and are not pre-




of Maryland has repeatedly declared that the courts will not interfere
with the decisions of the condemning authority as to the extent and
nature of the taking, and the necessity therefor, unless the condemnee
can show that the decision to take his particular property amounted
to an abuse of the legislative or administrative discretion conferred
upon that condemning authority by the legislature. To make such a
showing, the condemnee apparently must prove either that there
is no necessity whatsoever for the taking or that the action of the
condemning authority was so "oppressive, arbitrary or unreasonable
as to suggest bad faith."14
II. THE THREE APPROACHES To VALUE
Article III, section 40 of the Maryland Constitution commands
that no property may be taken by condemnation without "just com-
pensation." This standard is explained by article 33A, section 5 of
the Maryland Annotated Code, which interprets "just compensation"
as the "fair market value" of the property being condemned.'" "Fair
market value," according to section 6 of that same article, is defined as
"the price as of the valuation date for the highest and best use of
such property which a seller, willing but not obligated to sell, would
accept for the property, and which a buyer, willing but not obligated
to buy, would pay therefor. . . ."" It is obvious that these criteria
do not provide sufficient specificity to be of practical value to an
appraiser or to a jury in the valuation of a particular property. The
courts, therefore, have been obliged to supply the required specificity
and, accordingly, have accepted within the statutory definition of
"fair market value" three separate "methods"' 7 of valuing condemned
property:
(1) the use of sales of comparable properties as evidence
of value,'8 frequently referred to as the "market data
method";
(2) the estimation of the cost of replacing the improvements
on the property, less the depreciation of such improve-
ments, plus the fair market value of the land,19 sometimes
called the "summation method"; and
14. See, e.g., Sollins v. Baltimore County, 253 Md. 407, 252 A.2d 819 (1969);
Kline v. Mayor & Council, 245 Md. 625, 227 A.2d 217 (1967); Ligon v. Potomac
Elec. Power Co., 219 Md. 438, 149 A.2d 376 (1959); Murphy v. State Roads
Comm'n, 159 Md. 7, 149 A. 566 (1930).
15. MD. ANN. CODE art. 33A, § 5(a) (1971). For a section-by-section treatment
of article 33A, see Baker & Altfeld, Maryland's New Condemnation Code, 23 MD. L.
REv. 309 (1963).
16. MD. ANN. CODE art. 33A, § 6 (1971). The "valuation date" is defined by
section 4 of article 33A as "the date of the taking, if taking has occurred, or as of the
date of trial, if taking has not occurred .. "
17. See Mayor & City Council v. Concord Baptist Church, Inc., 257 Md. 132,
141, 262 A.2d 755, 760 (1970).
18. E.g., First Nat'l Realty Corp. v. State Roads Comm'n, 255 Md. 605, 258 A.2d
419 (1969); State Roads Comm'n v. Wood, 207 Md. 369, 114 A.2d 636 (1954).
19. E.g., Mayor & City Council v. Schreiber, 243 Md. 546, 221 A.2d 663 (1966).
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(3) the capitalization of the net rentals which the property
is capable of producing,20 often described as the "income
method."
While the intricacies of the three valuation methods are, of
course, the realm of qualified real estate appraisers, a knowledge of
the more fundamental aspects of the three approaches is indispensable
to an attorney involved in a condemnation suit.
As a practical matter, the appraisers retained by both the con-
demnor and the condemnee will compute the value of the condemned
property according to each of the three methods, if applicable, and
will arrive at a final opinion as to that value through a weighted
balancing of the three figures so obtained.21 Of course, the specific
nature of the property being condemned will often preclude the use
of one or more of the three methods. For example, the "replacement
cost" method is singularly inappropriate for determining the value of
unimproved real estate because it applies only to the valuation of
improvements; and the "income approach" would hardly be appropriate
in evaluating a church or hospital.
Because the present use to which a property is devoted is not
always its most productive use, the law requires that the appraiser
formulate an opinion as to its "highest and best" use.2 2 In most cases
this "highest and best" use is in fact the use to which the property
is actually being put by its current owner; but in some cases, de-
pending upon the location, zoning and topographical nature of the
property, the appraiser might conclude that the property is capable
of a use higher than that to which it is currently devoted. In making
this determination an appraiser, and the jury when weighing his
appraisal, may consider such elements as the reasonable probability
that, but for the condemnation, the property would have been rezoned
in the near future28 or that the property would have been subdivided
within the near future ;24 both of these probabilities are admissible as
evidence of value.
A. The Market Data Approach
While there can be no property which will be identical in every
respect to the property under condemnation, the reliability of the
market data approach is nevertheless dependent upon the similarity
of recently sold properties comparable to the condemned property.
The courts generally will afford the appraiser considerable latitude
in his selection of comparable sales and will permit him to use any sale
20. E.g., Bergeman v. State Roads Comm'n, 218 Md. 137, 146 A.2d 48 (1958).
21. The failure of an expert witness to testify as to one of the three methods does
not render his testimony inadmissible, but simply goes to the weight of his testimony.
First Natl Realty Corp. v. State Roads Comm'n, 255 Md. 605, 258 A.2d 419 (1969).
22. MD. ANN. CODE art. 33A, § 6 (1971) ; Burton v. State Roads Comm'n, 251
Md. 403, 247 A.2d 718 (1968).
23. Burton v. State Roads Comm'n, 251 Md. 403, 247 A.2d 718 (1968); State
Roads Comm'n v. Warriner, 211 Md. 480, 128 A.2d 248 (1957).
24. Lustine v. State Roads Comm'n, 217 Md. 274, 142 A.2d 566 (1958).
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which appears to embody enough of the various elements of compar-
ability to make its use helpful in reaching his conclusion. 5
Once the highest and best use is assigned to the property, the
range of properties which can be fairly deemed comparable is con-
siderably narrowed. Within this range, the appraiser will consider
such elements of comparability as the location of the two properties,
their proximity, the similarity of the physical nature or topography
of the two tracts, the similarity of the improvements or the potential
for improvement if the properties are undeveloped, the zoning of the
two tracts, their relative size, shape, frontage, type of soil or subsurface,
and other factors affecting value, such as any special utility possessed
by one property but not by the other.2" Each of these elements must be
weighed and compared by the appraiser in reaching his opinion.
One absolutely essential prerequisite to the use of a sale of com-
parable property as evidence of value is that the comparable sale be
the result of an arm's length transaction.27  If the comparable sale
were, for example, the product of condemnation, or the threat thereof,
the sale would not be evidence of the price at which a willing seller
and a willing buyer would arrive through the natural give and take
of a bargaining situation, as required by the definition of "fair market
value."' 2' Thus, evidence of such sales is invariably excluded as a
matter of law.2
9
Another important consideration is the date on which the com-
parable sale occurred. A sale which is significantly remote in time
will not be reliable evidence of the fair market value of the condemned
property as of the date of taking, no matter how similar the two
properties are in other respects. As a practical matter, most trial courts
apply a rule of thumb which excludes from consideration all comparable
sales concluded more than five years before the date of the taking.80
Of course, under the market data approach, the sale which is
most indicative of value in the eyes of the jury will necessarily be a
25. Id.
26. For example, the existence of mineral deposits on the land may enhance its
value appreciably. Smith v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 236 Md. 51, 202 A.2d 604(1964) ; State Roads Comm'n v. Creswell, 235 Md. 220, 201 A.2d 238 (1964).
27. See Goodman v. State Roads Comm'n, 251 Md. 727, 248 A.2d 796 (1969).
28. See notes 16-17 supra.
29. See Bonaparte v. Mayor & City Council, 131 Md. 80, 101 A. 594 (1917).
Recently, the Court of Appeals was asked to adopt a rule, apparently applied in otherjurisdictions, which would permit the use of sales of comparable property to a con-
demnor as evidence of value if the party offering that evidence can prove the volun-
tariness of the sale. The court was not receptive to this argument and reverted to the
rule established in Bonaparte. See Perlmutter v. State Roads Comm'n, 259 Md. 253
(1970).
30. Taylor v. State Roads Comm'n, 224 Md. 92, 167 A.2d 127 (1961); see
Bergeman v. State Roads Comm'n, 218 Md. 137, 146 A.2d 48 (1958). The five-year
rule is not a rule of law. Taylor v. State Roads Comm'n, supra; State Roads Comm'n
v. Adams, 238 Md. 371, 380 n.5, 209 A.2d 247, 252 n.5 (1965). In First Nat'l RealtyCorp. v. State Roads Comm'n, 255 Md. 605, 258 A.2d 419 (1969), the owner of the
property under condemnation was permitted to testify to his purchase of that property
nine years earlier. The Court of Appeals held that this was not reversible error. It is
clear, then, that the five-year rule of thumb is not a hard and fast proposition.
In a quick-take situation, evidence of comparable sales concluded after the
date of taking, but before trial, can be used as a basis for valuation. See Hance v.
State Roads Comm'n, 221 Md. 164, 175-76, 156 A.2d 644, 650 (1959).
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prior sale of the condemned property itself. Thus, if the condemned
property were purchased by the condemnee within a reasonable time
prior to the proposed taking, the condemnee's chances of receiving an
award or offer significantly in excess of the purchase price are
negligible unless some aspect of the prior sale would undermine the
persuasiveness of that sale as evidence of value. Of course, the existence
of a recent purchase of the condemned property also effectively precludes
an award which is significantly less than the prior purchase price.
B. The Replacement Cost Method
The "replacement cost, less depreciation" approach is, of course,
workable only where the condemned land is improved by a structure
of significant value in relation to the total value of the property. 1
Simply stated, "replacement cost" is the cost which would be incurred
in replacing a structure if that structure were to be rebuilt at the
same site on the date of valuation. However, this concept does not
require that the final valuation reflect the cost of reproducing the
structure in its original form. On the contrary, the term "replacement
cost," as used for valuation purposes, embraces only the cost of
constructing a structure with the capacity to perform the same function
according to modern standards of economy and utility. For example,
the "replacement cost" of a two-story factory or warehouse of early
twentieth century design, with vaulted ceilings and an antiquated
elevator system, might be the cost of building a factory capable of simi-
lar production, but of modern design, with low ceilings and, possibly,
a single-story layout for greater production efficiency. The obvious
difficulty which would attend the use of the cost of reproducing the
identical structure as evidence of value was noted in Chesapeake &
Potomac Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission,32 in which
the Court of Appeals explained that "[e]stimates of reproduction cost
are conjectural at best, not merely because they rest on opinion,
but for the obvious reason that probably no plant would ever be
reproduced in its present form.""3 Thus, the use of a "reproduction
cost" approach would result in a valuation based on the estimated cost
of duplicating facilities which are obsolete and which could be
reproduced only at prohibitive cost.
The determination of replacement cost is only the first step in
the "replacement cost, less depreciation" approach. The second step
is to subtract from the -replacement cost an amount representing the
31. See Mayor & City Council v. Himmel, 135 Md. 65, 70, 107 A. 522, 524 (1919).
For example, if the building were practically valueless, it would be a detriment rather
than an enhancement to the value of the land since it would have to be removed, at
some expense, before the land could be put to a productive use. Where this situation
occurs, resort to the market data approach is often necessary.
32. 201 Md. 170, 93 A.2d 249 (1952). While this is not a condemnation case,
the telephone company's argument that the Commission had improperly valued its
property for the purpose of determining a fair rate led the court into its discussion
of valuation.
33. Id. at 183, 93 A.2d at 254.
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extent to which the existing structure has depreciated since its
construction. Three distinct types of depreciation are considered:
(1) physical depreciation,
(2) functional depreciation, and
(3) economic depreciation. 84
Physical depreciation, the variety most often associated with the term
"depreciation," represents the actual structural deterioration of the
improvement as a result of age and use. Functional depreciation
reflects the improvement's loss of utility due to technological obso-
lescence in plant, design, layout and other similar factors. Because
the replacement cost method is based on concepts of modern utility,
this functional obsolescence may be partially or totally reflected in the
determination of the replacement cost of a particular improvement.3 1
Thus, the appraiser must take care to avoid duplication when
considering this form of depreciation in the context of this method.
The -third type of depreciation, sometimes called economic obsolescence,
involves factors which apply not to the structure itself but rather to
its relationship to the surrounding area; it generally reflects the extent
to which the neighborhood in which the condemned property lies has
deteriorated and -the effect of this decline on the value of the property
being condemned. This species of depreciation may be caused by
unfavorable changes in zoning, gradual changes in the size and
social characteristics of neighborhood population, or shifts from a
"higher" to a "lower" predominant use of property in the surrounding
area. Because the "replacement cost, less depreciation" method neces-
sarily involves a computation of the value of the underlying land under
the market data approach and because land does not depreciate physically
or functionally, the value of the land is added to the figure representing
"replacement cost" only after physical and functional depreciation
have been deducted. The only form of depreciation which can apply to
land, economic depreciation, is reflected as a natural and necessary
result of the market data approach since this factor is implicit in the
consideration of comparable sites in the neighborhood.
The "replacement cost, less depreciation" method, however, is
usually considered the least reliable approach to valuation except in
the case of structures of relatively recent construction. The estimation
of replacement cost necessarily involves some degree of conjecture.
Moreover, the selection of a depreciation factor is often an arbitrary
process, based almost exclusively upon the appraiser's judgment. The
weakness in this method can be partially remedied by additional expert
testimony. For example, the testimony of construction or engineering
experts as to the special structural attributes of the improvements
34. S. MCMICHAEL, APPRAISING MANUAL 51 (4th ed. 1970).
35. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS, TEE APPRAISAL OF REAL
ESTATE 199 (5th ed. 1967).
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and current building costs can be used to bolster the testimony of
the appraisers.
C. The Income Method
The third method of valuation, the "income" approach, is con-
siderably more complex in application than either of the two other
methods, if only because it involves economic and mathematical con-
cepts which are particularly foreign to the thought processes of the
average juror. The purpose of this approach is to arrive at the price
which a buyer would pay in order to receive the annual income which
the property can produce. This price is determined by "capitalizing"
the potential net income of the property at a rate which reflects the
buyer's desired percentage of annual return. Because the courts forbid
the use of profits generated by a business conducted on the condemned
property in computing the potential income from that property,36
admissible evidence of value is restricted to that of the potential rent
from the property. Despite this restriction, the income approach may
be applied both to property which is normally leasehold property
and to property which is owner-occupied. In the former case, the
"rent" which is capitalized is most often the net rent at which the
property is actually leased since that rent is presumptively the best
evidence of the rental income which the property is capable of producing.
With respect to owner-occupied commercial property, the appraiser
must compute a hypothetical rent using as a basis for his computation
the rents produced by comparable leasehold property in the area. Thus,
the hypothetical rent assigned to an owner-occupied property is
determined in much the same manner as value is computed under
the market data method.87
The result which the appraiser must reach, whether he bases his
computation on past rents of the property or computes a hypothetical
rent, is the "fair market rental" of the property. Once this fair market
rental is determined, the expenses which are normally chargeable
against that rental must be deducted in order to get an accurate picture
of the net income which the property can generate. The expenses
deducted should be those which, under a normal lease, the landlord
is obligated to defray, including taxes, heat, water, power, maintenance
and insurance.38 In the case of multi-tenant property, a reasonable
vacancy allowance should be subtracted; a building which can maintain
36. See notes 109-14 infra and accompanying text.
37. See Brinsfield v. Mayor & City Council, 236 Md. 66, 202 A.2d 335 (1964).
Brinsfield points out that the same degree of latitude applies with respect to the
admissibility of comparable rents as to comparable sales. Also, as under the market
data method, comparable rents considered as evidence of the hypothetical rent of the
condemned property must stem from leases negotiated at arm's length. The rent paid
by a corporation under a lease from its principal shareholder should not, for example,
be used as a basis for arriving at the hypothetical rent.
38. In some instances an adjustment must be made for normal burdens of the
landlord which are assumed by the tenant through covenants in the existing lease,
such as the payment of any excess property taxes- caused by an increase in the tax
rate or in the assessed value of the property. In certain cases, the lease may require
all expenses to be paid by the tenant, in which case no adjustments need be made.
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only one tenant may also require a vacancy allowance where there
is a rapid tenant turnover. This vacancy allowance can vary in amount
depending upon the rental history of the structure. For example, a
greater allowance should be deducted for a property with a history
of short-term tenants. Also, since multi-tenant properties may require
management, a reasonable allowance for this expense should be made.
When such expenses are deducted from the "fair market rental,"
the result is the net rent attributable to the property. The next step
is to determine what a willing buyer would pay, as of the date of
valuation, to receive an annual return from his investment which is
equal to this net rental figure. In order to arrive at this result,
the appraiser will "capitalize" the net rental using a specific percentage
figure which represents the rate of return which a buyer would expect
to realize from the property. This percentage, or "capitalization rate,"
consists of two distinct elements of return: the return which a buyer
would expect to realize on his investment and the expected return of
his investment. The return on the investment is, simply stated, the
annual rate of return which the buyer would expect to receive from
another investment of comparable risk; the greater the risk involved,
the higher the rate of return which the buyer will expect on his
investment. The return of the investment reflects the buyer's con-
sideration of what portion of his original invested capital will be
recoverable when he decides to liquidate his investment. Since the
improvements on the property would undoubtedly depreciate physically
during the term of his ownership and may depreciate functionally
as well, the price at which the buyer can ultimately liquidate the
structure is likely to be smaller than the price of his initial purchase.
Naturally, the hypothetical buyer will expect to recoup this ultimate
loss from the annual income which the property will produce during
his term of ownership.
The appraiser will compute percentage figures representing the
two forms of desired return, add those percentages together to arrive
at the "capitalization rate," and divide that rate into the net rent in
order to produce the figure which the hypothetical willing buyer would
pay in order to receive an annual return in the amount of the net rent.
Because the "capitalization rate" is a percentage or fraction, a high
rate will produce a smaller value than a lower rate. This result
reflects the realities of the market - a buyer will pay less for a piece
of property capable of producing a given level of income if that
property is a high risk investment with a limited usable life expectancy
than he will pay for a piece of property capable of producing the same
income, but representing a safer investment with the prospect of a
longer usable life.
In "capitalizing" the net rental, the appraiser must make an
adjustment for the amount of that net rental which is attributable to
the underlying real estate. Because land does not depreciate physically
or functionally, that portion of the "capitalization rate" reflecting
the expected return of the investment should not apply to the income
attributable to the underlying land; an adjustment in the capitaliza-
[VOL. XXX
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tion process must be made to compensate for this factor. Some
appraisers make this adjustment by reducing their capitalization rate
according to a formula based on the proportionate amounts of income
attributable to the improvements and the real estate. However, most
appraisers compensate for the inapplicability of physical and functional
depreciation to the underlying land by subtracting the amount of rent
attributable to that land from the total net rent before the net rent is
capitalized. The rent attributable to the land is normally calculated by
applying the capitalization percentage determined for purposes of
return on investment to -the value of the land as computed under the
market data approach. The resulting figure represents the rate of
return which a buyer would expect from the land, taking into account
the element of risk involved but not considering any factor of de-
preciation. After this figure has been subtracted, the remaining net
rent is capitalized to obtain a value for the improvements; the value
of the underlying land is then added to this value to reach the final
income valuation of the property as a whole.3 9
Because the major premise of the income approach is that a
purchaser will expect a reasonable return on his investment in the
property, this method is best suited to the valuation of investment
property. Investment property, as the term itself implies, is property
which is purchased because of its potential to produce income for the
purchaser.40 Thus, almost any business property can be classified as
investment property. Even though purchased as an "investment,"
owner-occupied residential property, because it does not produce income,
must be valued by the replacement cost or market data method.
Similarly, other types of non-investment property, such as hospitals,
schools, and similar public service property, because of their peculiar
nature, are not normally appraised by this method but rather are
appraised by applying the replacement cost approach to the improve-
ments on such property and then complementing that result with a
valuation of the underlying realty based on comparable sales, if any.
Certain special types of property present appraisal problems which
do not submit readily to conventional valuation according to any
of the three approaches. Department stores, for example, present
special difficulty because of their uniqueness. The comparable sales
approach proves unrewarding in such cases because of the scarcity
of comparable properties in the area and the even greater infrequency
of sales of any such comparable properties within recent years. Thus, the
39. An example of this "add back" method can be found in Stickell v. Mayor &
City Council, 252 Md. 464, 467, 250 A.2d 541, 543 (1969).
The principles of the income approach can be illustrated by the following
simple example:Gross rental value $ 12,500 $8,000 capitalized at 10% (2%Less projected expenses, allow- return of investment; 8%
ances, etc. 2,500 return on investment)-- $ 80,000
Plus value of land estimatedNet Rental Value .. - $ 10,000 pursuant to market data ap-Less rent attributable to land proach 25,000(8% return on land value
of $25,000) 2,000
Rent attributable to improve-
ments $ 8,000 Total value-income approack 9105.000
40. S. MCMICHAEL, APPRAISING MANUAL 29 (4th ed. 1970).
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appraiser is obliged to rely on the replacement cost and income ap-
proaches, neither of which yields results which are totally satisfactory.
The replacement cost approach is somewhat inappropriate because of the
earnings emphasis which pervades such a property. The income method,
seemingly the most fitting, is difficult to apply because of the frequent
lack of comparable rentals. In rare situations such as this, where none
of the three methods seems completely suitable, the appraisers and
the jury simply must improvise as best they can within the valuation
framework of the three accepted methods. Other examples of such
"special purpose" properties include churches,4 funeral homes, theatres,
parking lots, and grain elevators.42
III. THE PERMISSIBLE LIMITS OF A VERDICT
The extent to which a jury's verdict in a condemnation case
may deviate from the expert testimony as to the property's value was
examined in Bergeman v. State Roads Commission." In that case
the landowner brought an appeal alleging that the jury below had
based its verdict on its own speculation as to the proper valuation
instead of on the expert testimony presented in the case because thejury had rendered a verdict $3,000 lower than the lowest appraisal
presented by the condemnor's experts. The landowner concluded from
this that the jurors had based their verdict on their own impressions
of the property which had been formed when the jury viewed the
property. 4 While the court agreed that a verdict based entirely on
the jury's view could not be sustained, it rejected the landowner's
claim that the view could have been the only foundation for the verdict.
After analyzing the evidentiary factors which could have motivated
the jury in rendering its verdict, the court concluded that the jury could
have founded its award on the appraisers' testimony as to valuation
by the income method, but had interchanged the figures on which
that testimony was based. The court speculated that the jury could have
accepted the net rent figure of one of the condemnor's experts, but,
concluding that the capitalization rate used by that expert was too
low, had then arrived at a rate representing a compromise between
that rate and the rate employed by the condemnor's other appraiser.
Because the net rent figure of the first expert was considerably lower
than that estimated by the second appraiser, the application of the
higher capitalization rate to this lower rent figure resulted in an
award lower than the appraisal of either expert.45 Citing the hackneyed
41. The damages to be awarded for the taking of a church are specificall pre-
scribed in MD. ANN. CODE art. 33A, § 5(d) (1971), as follows: "the reasonabre cost
as of the valuation date, of erecting a new structure of substantially the same size and
of comparable character and quality of construction as the acquired structure at some
other suitable and comparable location within the State of Maryland ....... Thislanguage appears to place a greater emphasis on the actual reproduction of the struc-
ture than does the "replacement cost, less depreciation" method.
42. S. MCMICHAEL, APPRAISING MANUAL 394 (4th ed. 1970).
43. 218 Md. 137, 146 A.2d 48 (1958).
44. See MD. R.P. U18.
45. One of the condemnee's appraisers applied a 6% capitalization rate to an
annual net rent of $1,602, arriving at an estimated value of $26,700. The other expert
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rule that the weight of expert testimony -is a matter for consideration
by the jury, the court held that this "out-of-context" application of
the evidence by the jury was proper. Because the value of such expert
opinion depends on its underlying facts, the court concluded that there
could be no objection to permitting the jury to "draw their own
conclusions from such basic facts as they may choose to find. .. .
The danger of such a practice is obvious. Each of the expert
appraisals offered as evidence in a condemnation case is a consistent
whole, resting on a given set of carefully conceived assumptions. The
assumptions underlying each appraisal are different and depend upon
the viewpoint of the individual appraiser. If a jury can pick and
choose among the facts and figures of the different experts, the final
award will lack this element of consistency. The use of different
factors gleaned from different appraisals, each based on differing
assumptions, by a jury with little, if any, independent knowledge of
property valuation, can result in awards which do not remotely reflect
the true value of a piece of property. Such uncontrolled latitude in
the jury's consideration of the expert testimony seems inconsistent with
the constitutional mandate that no property may be taken without
just compensation.
A situation similar to that in Bergeman arose in Greater Baltimore
Consolidated Wholesale Food Market Authority v. Duvall,47 except
that in Duvall the verdict rendered by the jury was $92,000 greater
than the highest valuation of any expert and, thus, it was the con-
demnor who complained that there was no legally sufficient basis
for the verdict. The court concluded that the verdict was proper,
noting the wide range of comparable sales which had been admitted
into evidence, from which, apparently, the jury was free to select the
sales which it considered most applicable.4" The landowner had testified,
over the objection of counsel for the condemnor, that nearby developed
industrial lots had been sold for a price per acre which was almost
$15,000 in excess of the highest unit price referred to by any of the
appraisers. 49  The court nevertheless observed that "the jury is free
called by the condemnee applied an 8% capitalization rate to a net rent of $2,150 and
arrived at a final figure of approximately $27,000. The court concluded that the juryhad presumably applied a 7% capitalization rate to the $1,602 net rent figure and had
come up with a value of approximately $23,000, which was the amount of the verdict.
218 Md. at 140-44, 146 A.2d at 51-52.
46. Id. at 144, 146 A.2d at 52.
47. 255 Md. 90, 256 A.2d 882 (1969).
48. The court noted that the comparable sales admitted below ranged from$1,250 to $10,504 per acre and commented that the average of these sales was approxi-
mately $6,000. Id. at 97, 256 A.2d at 885. Since the jury's award was $7,250 per acre,
the inference is overwhelming that the jury had based its verdict only on the highest
of the comparable sales.
49. There is a rebuttable presumption that an owner of property under condem-
nation is qualified to testify as to its value. E.g., Mayor & City Council v. Schreiber,
243 Md. 546, 221 A.2d 663 (1966). Where the property is owned by a corporation,
however, a director, officer or shareholder of the corporation does not enjoy the benefit
of this presumption, but must demonstrate sufficient knowledge of the property if heis to qualify to testify as to its value. M.A. Realty Co. v. State Roads Comm'n, 247
Md. 522, 233 A.2d 793 (1967); Smith v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 236 Md. 51,202 A.2d 604 (1964). In DuvaU the owner testified that the property was worth$8,500 per acre, which, as the court inferred, could have affected the jury's verdict.
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to apply its independent judgment as to the weight of any facts
before it,"5 and closed with the comment that the "appellants' main
difficulty seems to be that the jury did not accept their appraiser's
valuation. '51 In fact, the jury had not accepted the valuation of any
of the appraisers.
The suggestion in Duvall that the jury can place crucial reliance
on "selected" comparable sales is rather disturbing, especially in light
of the considerable latitude exercised by the trial courts in admitting
evidence of comparability. The Court of Appeals has stated that, where
a sale offered as evidence of value embodies any reasonable elements
of comparability, testimony concerning that sale should be admitted
and the weight of the comparison left to the jury. 2 Any excesses of
the trial court in admitting such testimony are likely to go unchecked
since the Court of Appeals has also stated that the issue of compara-
bility is largely discretionary with the trial court and that even the
abuse of that discretion does not compel reversal, unless there is a
showing of "substantial injustice" to the complaining party3
IV. SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF VALUATION
A. Partial Taking
The damages to be awarded where only part of a property is
taken are prescribed by section 5(b) of article 33A. That section
provides:
The damages to be awarded where part of a tract of land
is taken shall be the fair market value (as defined in § 6) of such
part taken, but not less than the actual value of the part taken
plus the severance or resulting damages, if any, to the remainder
of the tract by reason of the taking and of the future used [sic] by
the plaintiff of the part taken. Such severance or resulting dam-
ages are to be diminished to the extent of the value of the special
(particular) benefits to the remainder arising from the plaintiff's
future use of the part taken.5 4
While section 5(b) begins with the declaration that damages
for a partial taking shall be the "fair market value" of the part
taken, a familiar condemnation concept, the application of this formula
is complicated by the statutory qualification that such damages may
not be "less than the actual value of the part taken" plus any severance
or resulting damages. The literal application of this language to a
partial taking situation would seem to require that two distinct
standards of valuation be employed and that the standard which
255 Md. at 97, 256 A.2d at 885. He also testified, over objection, that comparable
properties had sold for $25,000 per acre. Id. at 92, 256 A.2d at 884.
50. 255 Md. at 97, 256 A.2d at 885.
51. Id.
52. Lustine v. State Roads Comm'n, 217 Md. 274, 142 A.2d 566 (1958).
53. Adams v. State Roads Comm'n, 238 Md. 371. 209 A.2d 247 (1965).
54. MD. ANN. CODE art. 33A, § 5(b) (1971).
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produces the larger amount of damages be accepted as controlling.55
The case law prescribes that the "fair market value" of the part taken
is the difference between the fair market value of the entire property
before the taking and the fair market value of the remainder retained
by the property owner after the taking.56 There is no legislative or
judicial definition of "actual value." However, because it can safely be
presumed that an appraiser making a computation of "actual value"
would be restricted to the use of one or more of the three accepted
valuation methods, the most logical definition of "actual value" would
be the result obtained when the appropriate valuation method is applied
directly to the portion taken.
It is clear that this "actual" valuation standard can produce an
award in excess of "fair market value" as determined by the before-
and-after method. For example, consider a case where the State
Roads Commission institutes proceedings to condemn a strip through
the center of a large tract of land which has a value of only $1,000
per acre because of its limited frontage on a narrow country road.
The strip contains ten acres of land and is to be used for the construc-
tion of a parkway to which each of the two parcels remaining after
the severance will have access, and the total of the fair market value of
the two parcels after the taking exceeds the fair market value of the
whole tract before the taking because of this added frontage. Under
the before-and-after method of determining fair market value, the
property owner should receive nothing for the lost acreage; but because
the "actual value" of the strip taken is $10,000, assuming that the
strip has the same per-acre value as the entire tract, section 5 (b) seem-
ingly requires that he be awarded not less than that sum. The same
result would occur if the before-and-after method produced any "fair
market value" less than the $10,000 "actual value."
Therefore, in situations where "actual value" exceeds "fair market
value," as determined by the before-and-after method, the property
owner may receive an award which is unrelated to the real effect of the
taking on the value of the property as a whole. While the Court of
Appeals has not yet been called upon to consider this effect of section
5 (b), it is conceivable that the court would not affirm an award above
"fair market value" as computed under the before-and-after method.57
55. See Smith v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 236 Md. 51, 57-58, 202 A.2d 604,
607-08 (1964)
56. E.g., Big Pool Holstein Farms v. State Roads Comm'n, 245 Md. 108, 113,
225 A.2d 283, 285 (1967). However, the use of this method is not mandatory. See
Mayor & City Council v. State Roads Comm'n, 232 Md. 145, 192 A.2d 271 (1963).
57. Big Pool Holstein Farms v. State Roads Comm'n, 245 Md. 108, 225 A.2d 283(1967), while not presenting a valuation dilemma substantively analogous to that
created by section 5(b), reveals the disposition of the Court of Appeals with respect to
awards which do not reflect the condemnee's true loss. In that case, the Commission
quick-took a portion of a farm leaving part of the remainder without access. At the
trial the Commission was permitted to introduce evidence that it had secured an
option to purchase a contiguous strip of land which would provide access to the land-
locked acreage and that it had offered to exercise that option and convey the strip to
the owner. As the option had not been obtained by the Commission until after the
taking, the owner contended that the admission of this evidence was prejudicial. In
refusing to accept this position, the Court of Appeals said:
Under the appellant's contention, the measure of damages must be the differ-
ence in value between the tract affected with access, and the tract without access.
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The language employed in section 5(b) has presented other
definitional problems. Although -the use of the alternative terminology
"severance or resulting damages" implies that there is a distinction that
can be drawn between the two, those terms are used interchangeably
by the Maryland Court of Appeals in cases involving partial takings.
In fact, some of the partial taking cases speak only of "consequential
damages" even though .this term is also used by the court to describe
damages suffered by an abutting property owner whose property is
only affected by the condemnation. When used in connection with
partial takings under section 5(b), the three terms in fact are synon-
omous58 and are best described as "the difference between the value
of the remaining portion by itself and its value as a part of the whole.159
This difference in value is caused by various conditions resulting from
the severance, such as the loss or impairment of access or an undesirable
shape or size, either of which would depress the market value of the
remainder or subject the owner thereof to remedial expense. Section
5(b) provides further that severance or resulting damages are to be
diminished by the value of any "special benefits" which may accrue
to the remainder by reason of the taking. Special benefits are those
which are peculiar to the property involved, in contrast to general
benefits, enjoyed in common with the community surrounding the
public project for which the property is taken."0 The latter apparently
are not credited against severance or resulting damages. 6
B. The Valuation of Separate Interests
Real property is subject to a variety of interests which must be
acquired, or released by the holder, before the condemnor can obtain
an unencumbered title. Thus, before the condemning agency takes
Under this theory, the owner could obtain damages for most of the value of the
tract at the time of the taking, even though, after the taking, he can obtain
adequate access for a fraction of the amount he has received.
Id. at 113, 225 A.2d at 285. The court's reluctance to accept the condemnee's position
in this situation may provide some indication as to whether it will allow a "windfall"
afforded by legislative mandate.
58. Severance damages are sometimes defined as the diminution in value of the
remainder by reason of the severance of the parcel appropriated by the condemnor.
See 4 J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 14.1[1], at 476(rev. 3d ed. 1962). The term "resulting damages" apparently has no accepted defini-
tion. Sackman attempts to distinguish between "severance" and "consequential"
damages as follows: "While consequential damages are applicable to partial taking
cases, they are not peculiar to such situations but arise, in fact, in many cases where
there is a complete taking. Severance damages, on the other hand, by their very nature
arise only upon the taking of part of an owner's land." Id. at § 14.2, at 507. Orgel
insists that consequential damages exist only as a result of the use to which the land
taken is put by the condemnor. 1 L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 303 n.1 (2d ed. 1953). A perusal of the various definitions assigned by the
authorities makes it evident that any attempt at precise definition is futile.
59. S. McMICHAEL, APPRAISING MANUAL 437 (4th ed. 1970). While this quota-
tion is McMichael's definition of "severance" damages, it describes what the courts
are aiming at when they use the three overlapping terms.
60. 3 J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 8.6203, at 66
(rev. 3d ed. 1965).
61. The language of section 5(b) indicates that severance and resulting damages,
as well as special benefits, are to be independently considered only for the purpose of
adjusting an award based on "actual value." These factors are automatically taken
into account under the "before-and-after" method of computing "fair market value."
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any steps toward the acquisition of a property, it will have the title
examined in order to discover the identity of all parties in interest,
including the owner of the fee, the mortgagee, lienors and encum-
brancers, holders of easements, etc., and the owner of any leasehold
interest of seven years or more. 2 If condemnation proceedings are
filed, each of these parties is normally joined as a defendant. If the
interest has a liquidated value which is uncontested, as in the case
of a mortgage, the interested party may need only file a formal answer
and appear at the settlement in order to obtain payment out of the
proceeds paid or awarded for the property. However, if he holds a
subordinated interest in the property, such as a second mortgage, he
may find that his interest is in jeopardy, in which case he may desire
to actively participate in the litigation in order to protect that interest.
The value of unliquidated interests in the property must be
determined by the jury. If the property is held in fee simple absolute,
the jury need evaluate only that single interest. However, if there
is more than one interest in the property, each of those interests
may be entitled to compensation; the jury must then make separate
awards to the holders of each interest. The most typical possible
combinations of such interests include the ninety-nine year lease and
the reversion, commonly known as the ground rent, the life estate and
the reversion, mineral rights and the fee, and the respective interests
of landlord and tenant where the tenant occupies the property, or part
thereof, under a lease from year to year or for a longer term.
The most recent Maryland case dealing with the condemnation of
property subject to a ground rent is Heritage Realty, Inc. v. Mayor &
City Council8 3 In that case the condemnor, after purchasing prop-
erties subject to redeemable ground rents, -sought to acquire the
reversionary interests in those properties through condemnation. The
owners of the reversionary interests insisted that this procedure would
deprive them of their property without just compensation, claiming
that the condemnor, as holder of the leasehold interests, could extin-
guish the reversions only by redeeming them under the provisions of
the ground leases. The owners argued that by initiating condemnation
proceedings at a time when interest rates were high and the market
value of ground rents consequently depressed, the condemnor could
take the reversions at a price which would be considerably less than
that which it would be obliged to pay to redeem the ground rent.
The court rejected the owners' contentions, holding that the owner
of a reversionary interest, because he cannot compel the leasehold
owner to redeem the ground rent, has no right to demand that a
condemnor having title to the leasehold be limited to the redemption
procedure to the exclusion of condemnation procedures explicitly
authorized by statute. When such condemnation procedures are applied,
the court explained, the statutory definition of fair market value must
prevail; the owner of a reversionary interest can be compensated
62. A lease for less than seven years need not be recorded, and the identity of
a lessee under such a lease can be discovered only through inquiry.
63. 252 Md. 1, 248 A.2d 898 (1969).
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for that interest only to the extent of its value under the prevailing
conditions of the market place.
The problem of assigning a value to mineral deposits underlying
property which is subject to condemnation has been dealt with in a
perplexing fashion by the Maryland courts. It would seem that the
most logical approach would be to multiply the estimated volume of
the minerals by the prevailing unit value and then subtract the estimated
cost of extracting the minerals. However, this method has been
flatly rejected by the courts, which have uniformly ruled that mineral
deposits cannot be treated as a separate entity for valuation purposes."
The courts have conceded, however, that such deposits can be valued
as an integral part of the property and have permitted appraisers to
take the quantity and quality of such deposits into account in arriving
at the fair market value of the land as a whole. 65 The courts' reluctance
to accept quantitative evidence of the value of mineral deposits persists
even in cases involving mineral leases. In Smith v. Potomac Electric
Power Co.,6 6 the Court of Appeals held that, in valuing a leasehold
interest in minerals, the "value in place" of the minerals could be
considered, but that evidence of the lessee's projected costs and profits
from the lease was inadmissible. 7 The court indicated that the pertinent
evidence of the value of such a lease would be "the prevailing value of
[mineral] leases in the neighborhood."6
The compensability of a lessee's interest in property subject to
condemnation depends on the presence of two favorable circumstances.
First, his lease must not contain a condemnation clause which pre-
cludes him from asserting a right to claim a part of the proceeds in
the event of condemnation. Second, the rental which he pays must be
a "bargain rent," i.e., one lower than the fair market rental, which,
under the lease, he has the right to enjoy for a term running beyond
the valuation date.6 9 The latter factor is determinative of the value
of his interest in the leasehold. In more precise terms, the lessee's
64. In State Roads Comm'n v. Creswell, 235 Md. 220, 201 A.2d 328 (1964), the
Court of Appeals indicated that it would not permit mineral deposits to be valued as
a separate entity by the multiplication process, but did not rule on the question because
the issue had not been properly preserved below. In Smith v. State Roads Comm'n,
257 Md. 153, 262 A.2d 533 (1970), the court transformed the Creswell dictum into
holding.
65. See cases cited note 64 supra.
66. 236 Md. 51, 202 A.2d 604 (1964).
67. This is an illustration of the general rule that the use of business profits
in computing potential income from property is prohibited. See notes 109-14 infra
and accompanying text.
68. 236 Md. at 64, 202 A.2d at 611. The court further indicated that the price
for the minerals set out in the lease, in addition to the cost of regrading the property
pursuant to a covenant therein, had to be deducted from the final valuation of the
leasehold in order to arrive at the lessee's compensable damages.
69. For purposes of showing the duration of the lease beyond the valuation date,
the lessee can show his intent to have been to exercise renewal options in the lease
had the property not been taken. See Mayor & City Council v. Rice, 73 Md. 307, 21
A. 181 (1891). It is clear from Sholom, Inc. v. State Roads Comm'n, 246 Md. 688,
229 A.2d 576 (1967), that an option to renew a lease can be a compensable item of
damages whether or not the lessee exercised it prior to the taking. In Sholom the
court further indicated that an option to purchase was compensable under the same
circumstances. As the court pointed out, however, a lessee cannot recover for both of
these items where the options are alternative.
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interest has a value equivalent to the amount, discounted to present
value, by which the annual fair market rental exceeds the actual rent
paid by the lessee, multiplied by the number of years during which
the lease would have remained in effect after the valuation date but
for the condemnation of the property.7" The fair market rental is,
of course, established by evidence of rents paid by lessees for comparable
space within the area and, therefore, can be higher or lower than
the actual rent paid by the lessee of the condemned property.
Although it would seem logical to assume that the sum of the
values given the separate interests in a property can never exceed
the value of the property as an entirety, this is not always true. The
Court of Appeals has taken the position that in certain types of cases
the total of the awards to the owners of separate interests may, in fact,
properly exceed the worth of the property in the hands of a single
owner, 71 although the general rule is to the contrary.72
The exception to the general rule was first applied in Mayor &
City Council v. Latrobe,73 which involved the rather unique problem
of a partial taking of property subject to an irredeemable ground rent.
The court in Latrobe recognized the possibility that, because of the
market fluctuation typical of ground rents, the holders of the leasehold
and of the reversionary interest in such property could assign different
capitalization rates to their interests and thereby convince the jury to
accept values of those interests which, when totalled, could exceed the
value of the property in the hands of a single owner. The court
concluded that the two owners of the separate interests were each
constitutionally entitled to the proven value of their respective interests
in the condemned property even if this anomalous result followed74
and that, therefore, the special circumstances of the case required an
exception to the general rule.
The exception carved out in Latrobe has been discussed in several
cases but, until recently, was not extended beyond the very limited
type of application suggested by the Latrobe holding. In Mayor &
City Council v. Gamse,75 a case involving the taking of a leasehold
interest in an entire property, the Court of Appeals deemed the
exception inapplicable, explaining that the general rule can "ordinarily
70. See Viers v. State Roads Comm'n, 217 Md. 545, 551, 143 A.2d 613, 616(1958) ; Mayor & City Council v. Gamse, 132 Md. 290, 297-98, 104 A. 429, 432 (1918).
71. See, e.g., State Roads Comm'n v. Novosel, 203 Md. 619, 626, 102 A.2d 563,
566 (1954) ; Mayor & City Council v. Latrobe, 101 Md. 621, 631, 61 A. 203, 206 (1905).72. E.g., Viers v. State Roads Comm'n, 217 Md. 545, 550, 143 A.2d 613, 615(1958) ; see Gluck v. Mayor & City Council, 81 Md. 315, 32 A. 515 (1895).
73. 101 Md. 621, 61 A. 203 (1905).
74. The court explained its conclusion in the following language:[Wie are therefore of the opinion that owing to the peculiar character of this
class of property, if it be proven that the reversioner's interest was worth $10,000
and the leaseholder's $52,500, the latter sum could be allowed, although the wholeproperty, if no ground rent had been on it, would only have been worth $60,000.
We say that because each is entitled under the Constitution to be compensated in
damages for the amount of his interest taken, and if it be true that the values
of the two interests are more than what the lots would be worth, if owned by oneperson, the necessities of the case require an apparent exception to the general
rule announced above, as to what the condemning party, must pay.
Id. at 631, 61 A. at 206.
75. 132 Md. 290, 104 A. 429 (1918).
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be applied without difficulty ' 76 to the condemnation of an entire
property subject to a lease. In United States v. Certain Parcels of
Land,7 Judge Chesnut, speaking for the Maryland Federal District
Court, applied the exception to the taking of a city's interest in a
public street, a singularly limited factual context. The court strongly
implied that the use of the exception was directly conditioned on the
existence of a possible conflict between the general rule and the constitu-
tional right of interested parties to receive just compensation.78 The
existence of the exception was later recognized in dictum in State
Roads Commission v. Novosel;7 9 but in Viers v. State Roads Com-
mission,0 a case which, like Latrobe, involved a partial taking, the
court concluded that the exception was inapplicable because the case
before it involved "a short term lease, not a ground rent"'" as in
Latrobe. Up to this point, the effect of the decisions discussing the
exception was, therefore, to limit its use to cases involving special
valuation problems similar to those present in Latrobe and United
States v. Certain Parcels of Land. This strict limitation of the ex-
ception is consonant with the constitutional undertones which accom-
panied its use in those two cases. It is clear from the decisions discussed
thus far that the exception should be applied only where the use
of the general rule would interfere with the constitutional right of
holders of separate interests to prove and receive damages reflecting
the full value of their respective interests in the condemned property.
Two recent cases, however, have suggested that the erosion of
the general rule has been more substantial than an examination of
the earlier cases would indicate. The first of these cases, Sholom, Inc.
v. State Roads Commission, 2 involved the partial taking of a property
subject to an existing five-year lease which contained alternative options
to purchase the property during the five-year term or to renew the
lease at the end of that term. The lower court had excluded evidence
relating to the alternative options on the ground that they had not
been exercised. After holding the lower court's action improper, the
Court of Appeals was faced with a choice of either remanding the case
for a new determination of the total value of the condemned property
or simply directing the lower court to redetermine the relative shares
of the landlord and tenant in the sum which the prior jury had found
to be the value of the property as an entirety.
76. Id. at 293, 104 A. at 430.
77. 43 F. Supp. 687 (D. Md. 1942).
78. Judge Chesnut cited as support for his holding the case of Boston Chamber
of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910), which contains the following lan-
guage: "[T]he Constitution does not require a disregard of the mode of ownership, -
of the state of the title. It does not require a parcel of land to be valued as an
unencumbered whole when it is not held as an unencumbered whole. It merely requires
that an owner of property taken should be paid for what is taken from him. It deals
with persons, not with tracts of land. And the question is, What has the owner lost?
not, What has the taker gained ?"
79. 203 Md. 619, 102 A.2d 563 (1954).
80. 217 Md. 545, 143 A.2d 613 (1958).
81. Id. at 550, 143 A.2d at 615.
82. 246 Md. 688, 229 A.2d 576 (1967).
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The condemnor advocated the latter alternative, relying upon the
general rule that "the proper approach is to value the property as
though the entire title is vested in one person and then apportion
the award among the contending interests.""3 While the condemnor
recognized that the tenant might be entitled to a "larger slice of the
pie" as a result of the option contained in the lease, it claimed that
the size of that pie, that is, the value already placed on the property
by the jury, must remain the same. The Court of Appeals rejected
this argument, explaining:
Since, as we have said, the possible effect of Sholom's options
to renew on the value of its leasehold interest was erroneously
excluded we cannot agree that the size of the pie should be
accepted and merely re-sliced. If it can be said that there is a
general rule demanding the valuation of the entire estate before
apportionment to the respective interests therein, one must also
take into account how that general rule may have been eroded
by our holdings in Latrobe, supra, and State Roads Comm. v.
Novosel, 203 Md. 619, 102 A. 2d 563 (1954). See also, U. S.
v. Certain Parcels of Land, 43 F. Supp. 687 (D.C. Md. 19 42 )."
This language creates the misleading impression that there has been
a substantial and continuing "erosion" of the general rule.
A corollary effect of the Sholom holding is the clear implication
that the exception might be applicable to the partial taking of property
subject to a short-term lease containing alternative options to purchase
or renew. Such an implication is directly contrary to the conclusion
drawn by the court in Viers that the exception was not suited to the
partial taking of property subject to a short-term lease. It is also
contradicted by an examination of the Sholom facts: clearly a tenant's
proof of -the value of an option to renew or to purchase could only
reduce proportionately the value of the reversion and could not result
in any additional damages over and above the total value of the
property in the hands of a single owner. The only rational explanation
of -the Sholom language is that the court was concerned with the
procedural irregularity of remanding the case to a new jury with the
restriction that the total damages awarded by that jury could not
exceed the verdict rendered by the jury in the original proceeding and,
in seeking legal justification to avoid that irregularity, inappropriately
invoked the exception. Clearly, Sholom did not involve the special
valuation problems and potential constitutional conflict which would
justify the use of the exception created in Latrobe.
The unfortunate impression created in Sholom was nurtured by
the court's opinion in Heritage Realty, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council."3
In that case the City of Baltimore sought to condemn the reversionary
interests in certain properties subject to ground rents after having
already acquired the leasehold interests by negotiation. After their
83. Id. at 702, 229 A.2d at 583.
84. Id.
85. 252 Md. 1. 248 A.2d 898 (1969).
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primary contention had been rejected, 6 the owners of the reversionary
interests argued that the owners of the leasehold interests should have
been joined in the case to ensure that the total damages awarded for
the respective interests would not exceed the full value of the property
taken. The court responded, "If the City embarks on a policy of
piecemeal taking . . . it may well be that the total cost to the City
will be a sum which in the aggregate is greater than the value of the
property. Such a result was clearly forecast by our predecessors in
Mayor and C.C. of Balto. v. Latrobe .. .and found unobjectionable.
While it is true that the general rule should not have been
applied to the situation in Heritage because one of the separate interests
was acquired by negotiation, it does not follow that the Heritage
result should have been justified by reference to the exception. Heritage
did not involve the kind of special circumstance for which the exception
created in Latrobe was designed. Neither the general rule nor the
exception can apply except where there is a condemnation of both of the
separate interests in the property taken. The general rule is, quite
simply, a guarantee that the form in which property is held will not
affect the price which a condemnor must pay in order to appropriate
that property to public use. The exception is designed to limit that
guarantee in situations where its application would interfere with the
constitutional rights of the holders of the separate interests. Obviously,
the exception is unnecessary where the condemnor elects to forego the
guarantee by acquiring one of the separate interests through negotiation.
Thus, the Heritage court's reliance upon the exception was misplaced.
It can be concluded, therefore, that, notwithstanding Sholom and
Heritage, the exception is in fact severely limited in its application
and should be invoked only in those unique factual situations where
the use of the general rule threatens the constitutional right of the
owners of separate interests in condemned property to establish and
receive the fair market value of those interests.
V. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE PRESENT LAW
A. Some Procedural Inequities
A suit for the condemnation of private property has long been
regarded as a "special proceeding," falling within none of the tra-
ditional forms of action, for which special procedures, often in sharp
contrast with normal forms of practice, are necessary. While a con-
demnation suit is a special proceeding in the sense that it is born
of express constitutional mandate, some of the procedures which have
been historically followed or adopted for the trial of condemnation cases
are difficult to reconcile with the prevailing purpose of that mandate,
i.e., to ensure that no property is taken without just compensation.
A jury trial in a condemnation case is guaranteed by article III,
section 40 of the Maryland Constitution, presumably for the purpose
86. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
87. 252 Md. at 12. 248 A.2d at 904-05.
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of ensuring that the "just compensation" contemplated by that section
is in fact awarded to owners of condemned property. As a result,
a condemnation case is always tried before a jury unless all parties
to the suit agree in writing to submit the case for determination with-
out a jury"8 - a practice which is exactly the opposite of that in the
usual case at law, where a jury trial is awarded only if one of the par-
ties so elects. The upshot of this procedure for selecting the trier of fact
is that. the property owner, who is the constitutionally protected party,
must have .his property valued by a jury unless he can persuade the
condemnor, the party from whom he is constitutionally protected,
to agree to dispense with a jury.
It was undoubtedly contemplated by the framers of article III,
section 40 that the best method for protecting the property owner
was to entrust -the final decision as to the value of the condemned
property to twelve good men and true. That this conviction is
apparently still held by the courts is suggested by Master Royalties
Corp. v. Mayor & City Council,89 in which the Court of Appeals con-
cluded that no prejudice resulted to the property owners "by 'having
a jury trial thrust upon them."" °
The realities of condemnation cases have eroded the credibility
of this assumption. In these days of steadily increasing tax conscious-
ness, the average juror, already jealously protective of his tax dollar,
is either already aware or is made aware by his fellow jurors that
any award which he will vote to confer upon a property owner will
be paid, theoretically at least, out of that tax dollar. His awareness
of this fact exists even though comment by condemnor's counsel re-
ferring to the jury's status as taxpayers is prohibited."' While the
jurors' tax consciousness may not affect the size of their award in
any given case, it would certainly be consistent with the spirit of
constitutional protection of the rights of property owners to permit
the owner to elect whether to run the risk that it may. This risk is
compounded by the permissiveness which the courts have shown toward
those juries which substantially ignore the expert testimony in the
case in favor of far less reliable evidence of value 92 or which arrive
at their verdicts through piecemeal selection of inconsistent elements
of that testimony.93  Certainly a court trying a condemnation case
88. MD. R.P. U15a. This rule automatically prevents waiver of a jury.
89. 235 Md. 74, 200 A.2d 652 (1964).
90. Id. at 96, 200 A.2d at 664.
91. Shapiro v. Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, 235 Md. 420,
201 A.2d 804 (1964). As Shapiro indicates, a violation of this prohibition may not
always constitute reversible error. In that case, in his argument to the jury, counsel
for the condemnor commented that the award rendered by the jury would be paid
from the tax money of the State. The Court of Appeals held that this comment did
not constitute reversible error where the attorney for the condemnee had earlier
referred to the low budget of the condemnor to illustrate why the appraisals of the
condemnor's experts might be too low and, after condemnor's attorney had made the
statement complained of, had attempted to counteract its impact on the jury by
arguing that the award -would come mostly from federal funds instead of State tax
receipts. The court apparently viewed this latter act as a condonation by the con-
demnee's attorney of the improper comment by counsel for the condemnor.
92.: See note 47 srupra and accompanying text.
93. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
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without a jury would be more apt to weigh the evidence of value in
a more judicious and predictable manner. For these reasons, it is
submitted that the condemnee should have the unfettered right to elect
to have his case tried by a jury or by the court without a jury and
that this election should be binding upon the condemnor.94
In normal trial practice a party in an action at law has the right
to remove the case to another forum if he believes that a fair trial
may be denied him by the court in which his suit is pending. No such
right exists in a condemnation action. According to section 2 of
article 33A of the Maryland Annotated Code,95 a condemnation pro-
ceeding must be brought in the county in which the property to be
condemned is located or, if the property lies in more than one county,
in any county in which any part of the property is situated. Maryland
Rule of Procedure U15 ensures that the proceeding will remain in
the courts of the property county by unequivocally declaring that the
"right of removal granted by Article IV, Section 8 of the Constitution
of Maryland does not apply to proceedings for condemnation. '"96 This
forum-freezing can have serious consequences for certain types of
defendants. For example, absentee owners, when required to defend
a condemnation suit in the county in which their property lies, may
suffer considerable prejudice as a result of the parochial disfavor which
some communities hold for "outsiders" or "foreigners." This disfavor
may become particularly intense where the absentee owner is a large
urban-based corporation or where the taxes of the particular political
subdivision are to be the source of the jury's award. It certainly would
not greatly subvert the interest of the political unit in which the property
is situated to afford such disadvantaged defendants the opportunity to
bring their case before an impartial forum in another county. 7 More-
over, there can be no reason for this form of procedural discrimination
against the condemnee other than the notion that his fellow constituents
are specially qualified to decide the amount of money he should receive
for his property - a proposition which is clearly unsupportable.
Indeed, any such special qualifications would necessarily stem from
the individual's personal knowledge of the particular property and area,
a factor which might lead him to base his opinion of value on his
personal knowledge rather than on the evidence in the case.
Another inequity arises from the procedural structure of a con-
demnation case. Because the action is initiated by the condemnor,
the condemnor is automatically designated as the plaintiff in the case.9"
94. Bills which would have accomplished this result were introduced at the 1970
Session of the Maryland General Assembly, S.B. 472, 473, 474, 475, but were not
reported favorably by the Legislative Council.
95. MD. ANN. CODE art. 33A, § 2(a)-(b) (1971). The same requirements are
stated in MD. R.P. U2.
96. See Mayor & City Council v. Kane, 125 Md. 135, 93 A. 393 (1915).
97. A bill which would have created a right of removal in condemnation pro-
ceedings was introduced at the 1970 Session of the Maryland General Assembly,
S.B. 469, but was not reported favorably by the Legislative Council. While the
removal of a condemnation case might create obvious practical problems with respect
to the jury's view of the property, such problems would not be insurmountable.
98. MD. R.P. U4.
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Thus, the condemnor enjoys one of the foremost procedural advantages
afforded a plaintiff, the right to open and close at trial. The plaintiff
in other actions is given this advantage because he is normally the
party who must carry the ultimate burden of proof; however, the only
burden which the condemnor must shoulder is that of establishing the
right to take, which, if it is contested at all, is determined as a
preliminary matter by the court without the aid of the jury.99 Thus,
because the only issue presented to the jury is that of the value of
the property to be taken and because the condemnee has the practical
burden of proving that the condemnor's offer was insufficient, the
condemnee becomes, in reality, the constructive plaintiff; yet he does
not have the right to open and close which is given as a matter of
right to plaintiffs in every other type of action.1
B. Non-Compensable Damages
The condemnee usually is informed that his property may be
condemned by a newspaper article concerning a public agency's an-
nouncement of plans for the widening of a street, a new expressway,
an urban renewal area, or some other public project. More often than
not, the announced plan is subject to change and delay. This can be
the result of federal disapproval of the initial plan (where federal funds
are involved), relocation of the project because of concerted protest
from those within the affected area, or redesign because of changing
circumstances such as increased construction costs. It is not until
the passage of the implementing legislation, following which the
condemnee receives formal notice from the public agency involved,
that he can be reasonably certain that his property will be condemned
at some indefinite target date. The term "reasonably certain" must
be used because the plans remain subject to change even after the
formal notice. In fact, there is no absolute certainty of condemnation
until payment has actually been made. Until then, but not more -than
one hundred and twenty days after the entry of final judgment,
the condemning agency can change its mind by filing an election to
abandon the proceedings in accordance with section 13 of article 33A
of the Maryland Annotated Code. While that section provides for the
recovery of reasonable legal, appraisal and engineering fees actually
incurred by the condemnee in such event, no provision is made to
reimburse him for additional damages which he may suffer.
Consider the plight of the proprietor of a business who finds him-
self facing the immediate prospect of a trial to condemn the property
upon which he conducts his business or who has signed the usual
agreement giving the condemning agency an option to purchase
the property at a negotiated price. He cannot wait until the last
minute to find a new location upon which to operate his business;
99. See note 15 supra.
100. A bill which would have given the condemnee the right to open and close wasintroduced at the 1970 Session of the Maryland General Assembly, S.B. 470, but was
not reported favorably by the Legislative Council.
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therefore, relying on the proceeds which he expects to receive from
the condemnation suit or from the exercise of the option, he signs
a contract for the purchase of a new building. Should the condemning
agency then file an election to abandon, his predicament is obvious.
There are other circumstances working against the owner of
property, especially commercial property, subject to condemnation which
expose him to damages for which he is not compensated under present
law. One of -these is the effect which the announcement of the project,
and of the area in which it will be constructed, has on property within
the area. While property surrounding the area may increase in value
as a result of the announcement, there is obviously little or no market
for the doomed property -that lies within it. If the project is of any
magnitude, considerable time elapses following the announcement before
the condemning agency is in a position to make an initial offer for
the purchase of the property; more time is consumed in negotiation
after an offer has been made. If the owner is unwilling to accept the
final price which the agency offers to pay, he must wait for the legal
representatives of the agency to institute condemnation proceedings
and then for the case to come to trial. Even under the most favorable
conditions, the time span between the announcement and the payment
of compensation is usually measured in years, not months, except where
the quick-take procedure is employed.
The consequence to the condemnee of such delay can be serious.
He is frequently forced to buy or lease another building before the
condemnor acquires title to the first one, in which event he must bear
the expense of both during the interim.'' Should the condemnee elect
to build his new quarters, he will be obliged to acquire land upon
which to build long before the taking, so that he will be subject to
double expense for a much longer period.
If his building is leased when the project is announced and the
lease terminates before it is taken, he will usually be left with a vacant
building on his hands; .the rental income which he thereby loses is
never recovered. Conversely, if the building is leased for a term which
runs beyond the date of the taking, the lessee must buy or lease
elsewhere before he is dispossessed; yet he is obliged to continue to
pay rent to the owner until -the condemnor acquires the property. In
this situation, however, the lessee does have some leverage with which to
deal with the landlord if his interest as a lessee has compensable value. 10 2
If the condemnee is unwilling to accept the price offered for his
property and remains in the building until .his case is tried and settled,
he may find himself existing in a virtual no-man's land because the
other buildings in the project area either are vacant or have been demol-
ished. Arson, burglary and vandalism may then become costly problems.
The prospect of undergoing the travail just described is necessarily
a persuasive influence on the condemnee to accept the price offered
101. Often, the condemnee is permitted to lease the condemned property, in some
cases rent free, for a short period after the condemnor acquires title. However, thisgrace period still may not provide sufficient planning leeway to avoid the necessity
of maintaining two properties for a significant period of time.102. See notes 69-70 supra and accompanying text.
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by the condemning agency and to forego his right to have the value
of his property judicially determined. Should he nevertheless decide
to take the latter course, he is faced with additional expense in order
to have his day in court. He must employ an attorney, two appraisers
and, perhaps, other experts, and must pay them out of the sum which
he is awarded by the jury.
The common law does provide some protection to the property
owner against administrative delay caused by bad faith, negligence, or
default by the condemnor in its performance of some legal duty ;103
but the existence of these prerequisites to recovery is obviously difficult
to prove. Even where the delay is unreasonably long, no recovery is
available if the delay is attributable to "governmental inertia."' 4
It is undeniable that administrative delay in the acquisition of
property by condemnation has become the rule rather than the exception
and that such delay following the public announcement of the project
can have a depressing effect on the value of properties lying within
the project area. In 1963, the Maryland General Assembly evinced
some recognition of this problem 'by adding the following language to
the definition of "fair market value," found in section 6 of article 33A:
["fair market value" shall include] the amount, if any, by which
such price reflects a diminution !in value occurring between the
effective date of legislative authority for the acquisition of such
property and the date of actual taking if the trier of facts shall
find that such diminution in value was proximately caused by the
public project for which the property condemned is needed, or
by announcements or acts of the plaintiff or its officials concerning
such public project....
This addendum is designed to protect the condemnee against the
possibility that his property may become less valuable by reason of
delay or other circumstances following the public announcement of
the project. Unfortunately, even with the broad interpretation given
it by the Court of Appeals,""5 this statute does not go far enough to
103. See Friendship Cemetery v. Mayor & City Council, 200 Md. 430, 90 A.2d
695 (1952).
104. Lord Calvert Theatre, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council, 208 Md. 606, 119 A.2d
415 (1955). It is clear that deliberate acts on the part of the condemning authority
to depress or freeze the value of property to be condemned will not be permitted.
For example, in Carl M. Freeman, Inc. v. State Roads Comm'n, 252 Md. 319, 250
A.2d 250 (1969), the Court of Appeals struck down a county ordinance which pro-
hibited upward rezoning of any property lying in the path of planned roads or
highways. The court explained that the only purpose of the ordinance was to depress
land values.
105. In Mayor & City Council v. United Five & Ten Cent Stores, 250 Md. 361,
243 A.2d 521 (1968), the Court of Appeals considered the problem of when such
diminution in value must occur in order to be considered in determining value. The
condemnor argued that, even where the diminution is caused by the announcement
of the taking, the diminution still must occur between the granting of legislative
authority for the taking and the date of the taking to be compensated under section 6.
The court rejected this argument, interpreting the language of the section to mean
that diminution is taken into account if it satisfies two alternative tests: (1) if it
occurs between the granting of legislative authority and the date of the taking or(2) if it is proximately caused by the public announcement of the taking. The court
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provide compensation for the double expenses incident to the timely
acquisition of substitute property, for rentals lost as a result of vacat-
ing tenants or for the other types of damage which he may suffer.
After the proceedings have terminated and the condemnee has
been paid what the jury feels his property is worth, and perhaps
something more which may pay a portion of his expenses, he is by
no means in -the same financial position as he would have been had
his property not been taken, because of today's inflationary economy.
If he buys or builds a replacement for the property which has been
taken from him, it is more than likely that it will cost him more than
he received for his former property.'0 6 Moreover, it is distinctly possible
that any new mortgage which he will need in order to build or buy
replacement property will contain a higher interest rate than one which
may have existed on the condemned property. If he decides to lease,
the amount of rent which 'he must pay will probably be higher than
the rental value of his former property. °0
If the condemnee has operated a retail establishment on the
property which is condemned, he may suffer a loss of goodwill when
forced to move to a new location. This loss is not compensated as
a part of the condemnee's moving expenses 08 and cannot be reflected
observed that under the condemnor's interpretation, the Mayor could announce the
taking, wait until the resulting diminution in value has occurred and then obtain
legislative authority, thereby depriving the condemnee of any compensation for the
diminution. This question would, of course, be moot if the condemnor has continuing
authority to condemn. In such cases, section 6 measures the "effective date of the legis-
lative authority" by the "administrative determination" to condemn. Practically speak-
ing, this administrative determination must always precede the public announcement.
106. The effect of the higher cost of replacement property has been somewhat
reduced with respect to owner-occupied single- or two-family dwellings as a result of
the enactment of MD. ANN. CoDE art. 33A, § 6A (1971), which was added to the
Condemnation Code by ch. 466, § 1(6A), [1968] Md. Laws 849. The new section
provides owners of such property with an allowance, not to exceed $5,000, for the
amount by which the "average costs, within the same political subdivision, of a decent,
safe and sanitary dwelling" exceeds the fair market value of the property taken.
107. MD. ANN. CoDE art. 33A, § 12(a) (1971), expressly excludes from moving
costs any lost profit or good will which results from the taking or any compensation
for the acquisition of a new location.
108. See note 107 supra. The moving expenses authorized by article 33A, section
12 are quite limited. Section 12(a) provides that "any person at whose expense any
personal property, dead body, grave marker or monument must be removed as a
reasonably necessary consequence of . . . condemnation or purchase in lieu of con-
demnation, shall be entitled to receive from the condemnor or purchaser a pecuniary
allowance for the reasonable costs of removing and placing the same to another
location within a reasonable distance. . . ." This allowance cannot reflect any loss of
good will resulting from the move to a new location. It cannot exceed the fair market
value of the personal property which is moved. MD. ANN. CoDE art 33A, § 12(c)(1971). It must be reduced by the cost attributable to moving such personal property
to an "unreasonable location." MD. ANN. CODE art. 33A, § 12(d) (1971). For the
moving allowance to be available, the transported property must have been used by the
condemnee at his old location and must be intended for use by him at his new location.
MD. ANN. CoDe art. 33A, § 12(c) (1971). Section 12 does not require the con-
demnor to compensate the condemnee for damages to his personal property incurred
as a result of the condemnation. Ridings v. State Roads Comm'n, 249 Md. 395, 240
A.2d 236 (1968). Dispossessed tenants who are obligated by their lease to remove all
personal property from the premises at the end of their term cannot receive full
compensation for their moving expenses unless five years of their term, including
options to renew, remain at the time of the taking. The moving allowance is reduced
by one-fifth for each year by which five years exceeds the number of full years remain-
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in the valuation of the property because it falls within the prohibition
against estimating fair market value of property under condemnation
on the basis of gross sales or profits generated by a business conducted
thereon. 0 9 The justification usually given for this proscription is that
the capitalization of business profits is evidence only of the value
of the business; it is the property, rather than the business, which
is the subject of condemnation."' While it is quite true that the
success of a business cannot be attributed only to its location, it is
equally clear that a property's location will have an effect, often
significant, on the success of the enterprise. Certainly a prospective
ing in the tenant's term. However, this adjustment cannot reduce the moving allow-
ance below $2,500. MD. ANN. CODE art. 33A, § 12(b) (1971).
A recently added section of the Condemnation Code provides additional
relocation benefits for. owners whose property is taken for State-financed highway
projects. MD. ANN. CODE art. 33A, § 6B (1971). This section, which was enacted
during the 1969 legislative session (ch. 242, (1969] Md. Laws 699), and which must
be renewed each year by the General Assembly (see, e.g., ch. 268, [1970] Md. Laws
647), places owners of property condemned under State-financed highway programs
in the same position as owners of property taken for federally financed highway
programs, who enjoyed the more substantial relocation benefits provided by 23 U.S.C.
§§ 505-07 (1964).
However, section 6B has now been rendered obsolete by the Uniform Reloca-
tion Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (Pub. L. No.
91-646, 84 Stat. 1894), which as of January 2, 1971, consolidated the federal relocation
assistance programs and thereby repealed 23 U.S.C. §§ 505-07 (1964). This new
relocation assistance law could have a significant impact on the relocation benefits
available to a Maryland condemnee.
First, owners and lessees of property condemned by a federal agency will
receive (1) actual reasonable moving expenses, (2) compensation for actual direct
losses of personal property as a result of moving or discontinuing his business or farm
operation, and (3) actual reasonable expenses in searching for substitute property.
In addition, the condemnee can elect, in lieu of accepting these actual expenses, to
receive a fixed relocation allowance. The new relocation law also provides generous
allowances for replacement housing for displaced homeowners and tenants who occupy
condemned dwellings.
Second, the new relocation law extends these benefits to owners or tenants
who are displaced by state programs receiving federal financial assistance. The federal
agency which is to provide such assistance cannot approve any grant or agreement
extending such assistance until the appropriate state agency provides "satisfactory
assurances" that the specified relocation benefits will be provided by that state agency.
The cost incurred by the state in providing those benefits are included as part of the
cost of the program for which the financial assistance is extended. The statute
further provides that the states must by July 1, 1972, revise their laws to enable their
agencies to provide the "satisfactory assurances" required as a prerequisite to receiv-
ing federal assistance. Section 12 of the Maryland Condemnation Code currently
provides that a condemnor can pay moving expenses in excess of those authorized by
the Code if the condemnor will be wholly or partially reimbursed for such payments
by federal funds. MD. ANN. CODE art 33A, § 12(i) (1971). Condemnors involved
in projects in Baltimore City are specifically authorized by this section to comply
with the terms and conditions required by federal law as a prerequisite to federal
financial assistance. A bill has been introduced in the 1971 Session of the Maryland
General Assembly which would amend section 12(i) so as to extend such authorization
to all Maryland condemnors as of July 1, 1971. See H.B. 379. A bill which would
provide a more precise compliance with the new federal legislation is currently in
the drafting stage.
Third, the Maryland General Assembly may see fit to extend the benefits
afforded under the new federal statute to condemnees under State-financed programs.
A precedent for such legislative action was set by the enactment of MD. ANN. CODE
art. 33A, § 6B (1971), which extended the relocation benefits afforded by federal
highway assistance programs to condemnees of State-financed highway programs.
109. See Bergeman v. State Roads Comm'n, 218 Md. 137, 146 A.2d 48 (1958);
State Roads Comm'n v. Novosel, 203 Md. 619, 102 A.2d 563 (1964).
110. State Roads Comm'n v. Novosel, 203 Md. 619, 623, 102 A.2d 563, 565 (1954).
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buyer of business property, whose proclivities are the very essence of
the definition of fair market value, will give considerable weight to the
success of the business located on that property in deciding what
to pay for the property. This factor was given limited recognition by
the Court of Appeals in State Roads Commission v. Novosel,"' where
an appraiser was permitted to consider the volume of business trans-
acted on the condemned property in reaching his opinion of its value.
The court perceptively observed:
With the increasing vogue of leases of business property re-
serving rentals computed on a percentage of the volume of business
transacted by the tenant, it would be artificial and illusory to
reject an expert opinion of rental value that takes into account
the volume of business which experience has shown a particular
piece of property is capable of producing; and, of course, the
resulting profits may be, if anything, even more pertinent to the
question of value.1
1 2
After taking this enlightened viewpoint, however, the court affirmed the
lower court ruling which had admitted an expert's appraisal based in
part upon his consideration of business volume and profits, but which
had precluded the expert from testifying as to the actual figures involved.
In Brinsfield v. Mayor & City Council"-' this rule was contrasted with
rulings in other states which either permitted or absolutely proscribed
expert reference to business profits: "Maryland, however, has adopted
an intermediate course and allows experts to base the opinion of value
at least in part on a consideration of gross sales, but does not permit
the expert, at least on direct examination, to reveal the amount of
the gross sales so considered.""' 4 Thus, while the Maryland courts
permit use of business profits as a partial basis for expert appraisals
and leave the evidentiary weight of a business profit factor to the
jury, they deny the jury the raw material for the efficient execution
of this weighing process by refusing to admit the actual profit figures,
thereby opening the door to speculation. This "intermediate course"
appears to embody the less desirable aspects of the two extremes.
If the fair markt value of a condemned retail property is to reflect any
loss of good will occasioned by the condemnee's forced change of
location, and thereby more closely conform to the concept of just
compensation, the expert appraiser should be permitted to analyze be-
fore the jury the actual business volume and profits which his study finds
to be related to the advantageous location of the condemned property.
The most direct cost to an owner involved in condemnation pro-
ceedings is, of course, the expense incurred as a result of the actual
litigation. While the Maryland Condemnation Code currently provides
for the payment of litigation costs by the condemnor, 15 such costs
111. 203 Md. 619, 102 A.2d 563 (1954).
112. Id. at 624, 102 A.2d at 565.
113. 236 Md. 66, 202 A.2d 335 (1964).
114. Id. at 70, 202 A.2d at 337.
115. MD. ANN. CODE art. 33A. 4 7(a) (1971).
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include only the usual per diem jury fee, the cost of transporting the
jury to view the property, the cost of furnishing meals for the jury
if so ordered by the court, the cost of recording the required documents,
and normal court costs." 6 However, the most significant costs to a
condemnee in defending a condemnation action - the legal fees and
compensation for expert witnesses - are, under the current statutory
scheme, paid by the condemnor only if the judgment is for the
eondemnee on the right to condemn.'" Thus, where, as in most
condemnation actions, the condemnee ,has no basis for challenging the
condemnor's right to take the property, he must anticipate substantial
legal and appraisal fees if he decides to judicially contest the sufficiency
of the condemnor's offer for the property. Because these expenses can
be relatively substantial and because he must pay these expenses from
the increment in price, if any, which he may obtain through litigation,
the condemnee may accept the price offered rather than undergo the
gamble inherent in a trial. Surely it is no more than fair to require
the condemnor to pay the condemnee's reasonable legal and appraisal
fees, at least in those instances where the condemnee succeeds in
procuring an award greater than the condemnor's highest offer as
well as where he prevails in litigating the issue of the condemnor's
right to condemn." 8
Unfortunately, the law still considers the property taken as if
it were in a vacuum and smugly assumes that the constitutional
guarantee of just compensation to the condemnee is fully Satisfied if
he is given the "fair market value" of his property.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is an undeniable reality of the Maryland condemnation scheme
that property owners who are designated by the State to relinquish
their property for the public good often must undergo financial hardship
as a consequence. Although recent federal legislation has contributed
to the reduction of the more direct financial consequences of condemna-
tion," 9 the Maryland condemnee still faces the very real prospect of
significant financial loss when his property is condemned or sold under
threat of condemnation. In his attempts to mitigate this potential loss,
the condemnee is hindered by procedural and evidentiary formalities
which are often archaic and inappropriate. While the condemnee's
financial sacrifices do not result from any deprivation of legal or con-
stitutional rights under the relevant Maryland authorities, it seems truly
unfair that a condemnee should be obliged to suffer such financial
losses simply because 'his property is needed for the common good.
116. MD. ANN. CODE art. 33A, § 7(b) (1)-(4) (1971).
117. MD. ANN. CODE art. 33A, § 7(b) (5) (1971).
118. A bill which would have effected this result was introduced at the 1970 Session
of the Maryland General Assembly, S.B. 471, but was reported unfavorably by the
Legislative Council.
119. See notes 1 & 108 supra
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